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REVISING THE ROLES OF MASTER 
AND SERVANT: A THEORY OF WORK 
LAW 
Stephen Nayak-Young* 
In this article, I critically examine the claim that work law is best 
conceived as a subspecies of contract law, arguing that this characterization 
is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively instructive. Rather than 
understanding work law as a set of restraints on freedom of contract, we 
should see it as creating and defining special relationships, much like the 
codified definitions of marriages and business partnerships. I trace the 
development of work relationships through the common law of “master and 
servant” and their more recent statutory modification. I argue that the 
history and present form of work law are not consistent with the contract-
centered view of work law as “interfering” with an otherwise free labor 
market. In addition, I set the stage for a future research project in which I 
will argue that since work relationships permit employers to exercise 
authority over workers, a just work law would narrowly circumscribe 
employers’ authority in order to achieve work law’s justifiable aims while 
minimizing overreaching by employers. 
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I. WORK LAW AS I SEE IT 
A. Brief Introduction 
In this paper, I will explore and analyze the philosophical foundations 
of laws regulating labor and employment (hereafter, “work law”). I will say 
more below about what I intend to include within the body of “work law” 
that is my subject, but as an initial description, I will focus my analysis on 
laws that govern the relations between employers and employees in the 
United States and other common-law jurisdictions. More importantly, I will 
argue for the adoption of a particular way of viewing and understanding 
work law and an associated normative framework through which to assess 
its legitimacy. 
I argue herein for the view, which I will call the “relationship view,” 
that work law defines and regulates the authority relations involved in work 
relationships, particularly those within firms. This would constitute a 
departure from the more prevalent alternative view of work law, which I 
will call the “freedom-of-contract view.” This view holds that work law is 
best understood as a set of constraints on freedom of contract in labor 
markets which primarily affect decisions whether to enter a given 
employment relationship and bargaining over compensation and benefits. 
In contrast, the relationship view suggests that we analyze work law as 
constituting and regulating the nature of work relationships, which are 
essentially status-based governance relationships. Furthermore, a critical 
evaluation of a given jurisdiction’s body of work law should focus on 
whether and to what extent these governance relationships might be 
justified. Accordingly, my positive project in this dissertation is to argue 
that the primary purposes of work law are and should be to define and 
regulate the nature of the work relationship, to provide effective checks 
against abuses of authority, and to recognize and permit only legitimate 
exercises of authority in the workplace. 
In addition, I will pursue the negative project of arguing that the 
aforementioned freedom-of-contract view of the nature and purpose of 
work law is flawed and incomplete. The view mistakenly holds that work 
law is best understood as a part of contract law, which largely consists of 
restraints on freedom of contract in labor markets. Moreover, the view errs 
in placing undue emphasis on the negotiations and transactions through 
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which parties enter or modify the terms of work relationships, to the 
exclusion of the “internal” aspects of employment relationships with which 
work law is primarily concerned. 
B. What I Mean By “Work Law” 
I follow what I take to be a current trend in legal academia by 
referring to the area of law governing the terms and conditions of work and 
working relationships as “work law.” I will now expand on my earlier 
remarks in order to provide a necessarily rough but fuller picture of what I 
mean to discuss under the term “work law.” 
I will first explain why I choose not to refer to the body of law in 
question as the law of “labor,” “employment,” or both. Although the term 
“labor law” is often used in a broader sense in other common law legal 
systems, such as those of England and Canada, Americans tend to use 
“labor law” to refer more specifically to laws regulating unions. This is 
understood as largely distinct from “employment law,” which is understood 
to refer to laws regulating non-union hired workers. Perhaps because of 
these terms’ ambiguity, some U.S. scholars use the term “work law” to 
refer to the body of law comprising both labor law and employment law, 
along with other laws regulating the world of work. 
For example, Orly Lobel argues, in an article titled “The Four Pillars 
of Work Law,” that U.S. work law comprises labor law, employment law, 
employment discrimination law, and the laws regulating employee 
benefits.1 I do not dispute Lobel’s claim that these topics constitute the 
“four pillars,” but I will occasionally use the term “work law” more 
broadly. For example, although law schools typically do not offer entire 
courses devoted to the study of the federal and state Occupational Safety 
and Health Acts, these statutes’ principle purpose is to promote and ensure 
health and safety in the workplace by regulating relevant minimum 
standards, so I consider them part of work law. Similarly, I will also use 
“work law” to refer to federal, state, and local regulations mandating the 
provision of various facilities in workplaces, such as bathrooms, break 
rooms, and first aid equipment.2 In short, I understand “work law” as the 
 
 1.  Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1539 (2006) 
(“Work law developed in the American legal system as a patchwork of common law 
doctrine, federal and state statutes, and evolving social norms. Typical law school curricula 
often include courses related to the four pillars of work law: ‘employment law,’ ‘labor law,’ 
‘employment discrimination,’ and some variation of a tax-oriented ‘employee benefits 
law.’”). 
 2. See, e.g., OSHA General Industry Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (2014); OSHA 
Construction Industry Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1926 (2014) (providing examples of such 
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body of laws in a given jurisdiction which directly define and regulate the 
employer-employee relationship, and I will therefore use the term in this 
expansive sense and use the specialized terms “labor law,” “employment 
law,” “employment discrimination,” “employee benefits,” and “workplace 
safety regulations” in their usual, narrower senses.3 
I should also say something about the areas of law that I want to set 
aside in my discussion of “work law.” First, it is worth noting that, as Lobel 
explains, “[t]here are over two hundred statutes that regulate the workplace 
at the federal level alone,” so it would be impossible to discuss all instances 
of work regulation even if I considered them all equally germane to my 
discussion herein.4 Moreover, I think that many such instances are outside 
 
regulations). These regulations are typically contained within the jurisdiction’s OSHA 
statute, but for the purposes of my discussion herein, they seem to have a different emphasis 
from the OSHA regulations focusing on safety, e.g., those limiting exposures to dangerous 
conditions, requiring the use of safety equipment meeting minimum standards, etc. 
 3. Please note, however, that this usage is not universal, and many of the authors I cite 
herein use the terms differently. For example, it is especially common to see “labor law” 
used in the same broad “catch-all” sense in which I use “work law,” and other common 
variations include “labor and employment law” and “workplace law.” See, e.g., Horacio 
Spector, Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1120 
(2006) (defining labor law as a number of restraints on the freedom to contract in the labor 
market); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical 
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (2002) (discussing the history 
of American labor and employment law); James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, The Warp 
and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law 
and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1231 (2008) (exploring the statutory interpretation 
of workplace law). 
 4.   Lobel, supra note 1, at 1540, n. 4 (2006) (citing Labor Management Relations 
(Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2000) (“limiting the scope of collective 
bargaining: excluding, for example, supervisory workers”); National Labor Relations 
(Wagner) Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000) (“setting the regime for collective 
bargaining and founding the National Labor Relations Board to check disputes”); Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“setting 
minimum-wage, overtime, and child-labor restrictions”); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“amending the FLSA”); Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000) (“amending the 
NLRA”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(2000); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000 
& Supp. II 2002); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-1461 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1506-1781) (2000); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
2001-2009 (2000) (“limiting use of lie detectors at work”); Workers’ Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2000) (“requiring notice to 
employees in major layoffs and plant closures”); Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 
1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“providing unpaid leave of up to 
twelve weeks for sickness or dependent care”); Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2945 (2000); Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA) of 1969, 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 801-962 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-
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the scope of the “work law” I have in mind to discuss. For example, state 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)5 laws bear on the lives 
of workers in several ways, most obviously by setting forth the terms under 
which and the extent to which their communities are willing to support 
them when they are in need of public assistance. Less obviously, these laws 
also make up part of the large and varied body of jurisprudence that 
contributes to the definitions of terms such as “work,” “employment,” and 
“job” within a given legal system. Despite these connections with the law’s 
regulation of workers’ lives, I exclude TANF laws from the “work law” I 
want to discuss because I understand it to comprise all and only those laws 
that directly regulate the work relationship. In addition, I will exclude most 
“higher-level” policy that is, arguably, intended to influence employers, 
employees, or workplaces via indirect incentives or penalties rather than 
direct regulation of what the parties in work relationships may, must, or 
must not do. 
For example, I exclude the core provisions of job-creation and -
training programs such as the Workforce Investment Act of 19986; the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996,7 which implemented the aforementioned TANF and “workfare” 
programs in the United States; and in general, any federal, state, or local 
taxation, environmental, consumer protection, food and drug safety, or 
other laws or regulations that offer incentives or impose costs on either 
employers or employees in ways that arguably aim to influence their 
conduct in or with respect to work relationships. 
II. INITIAL SKIRMISH WITH THE FREEDOM-OF-CONTRACT VIEW 
Despite the centrality of work in most people’s lives, theoretical 
discussion of work law has been scant in contemporary legal and political 
scholarship. This scarcity may be largely explained by the freedom-of-
 
707 (2000) (“requiring large employers to have substance-abuse programs”); Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 601-619 (2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) 
(“creating the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)”); Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000) [note that all text in 
quotation marks in this parenthetical is quoted verbatim, with the permission of the author, 
from the above-cited passage in Orly Lobel’s The Four Pillars of Work Law]). 
 5.  See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (2006) (codified as amended in various sections of 42 
U.S.C. § 601). “TANF” is the current statutory name for the form of social insurance 
usually known as “welfare.” 
 6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2945 (2000). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2000). 
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contract view’s assumption that work relationships can be adequately 
analyzed under the existing and relatively well-developed philosophy of 
contract law. For example, Horacio Spector notes that the “paucity of 
contemporary philosophical works on labor law is surprising,” but he 
simultaneously asserts that labor law is no more than “a complex bundle of 
restraints on freedom of contract in the labor markets.”8 Moreover, Spector 
proposes, in an article titled “Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law,” 
merely to “focus on philosophical arguments relevant to the justification of 
labor law institutions.”9 Spector’s remarks suggest that we can understand 
work relationships entirely through the lens of contract law and define the 
“philosophical foundations of labor law” as the project of attempting to 
justify such laws’ intrusions into “freedom of contract in the labor 
markets.”10 
This approach is bizarre in light of work law’s emergence from the 
laws of master and servant. This is a distinctive form of status-based law. 
Work law is no more an intrusion upon the employment contract than 
marriage law “intrudes” upon the marriage contract. To the contrary, 
marriage law constitutes the marital relationship, which can then only be 
modified by contracts such as prenuptial agreements. Similarly, work law 
constitutes the work relationship, which can then only be modified in 
limited ways by particular employment contracts.11 
 
 8. Spector, supra note 3, at 1120-21 (“Basically, labor law is a complex bundle of 
restraints on freedom of contract in the labor markets. According to Henry Farnam’s 
classification, such legislative measures fall into three different types: protective labor 
legislation, distributive legislation, and permissive legislation. Protective legislation 
includes compulsory regulation of the labor contract such as child labor laws, maximum 
hours laws, and health and safety laws. Today, this type of legislation also encompasses the 
prohibition of sexual and moral harassment at work and nondiscrimination in recruitment 
and hiring. Distributive legislation seeks to affect the terms of exchange; for example, 
compulsory payment in legal tender, minimum wage laws, control of wages, and retirement 
security. Compensation for arbitrary discharge is often regarded as a distributive measure, 
but it can also be taken as a piece of protective legislation if it seeks to guarantee fair and 
humane treatment in the workplace. Finally, permissive legislation facilitates the creation of 
institutions for concerted worker action, collective bargaining, and labor arbitration.”). 
 9. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added). 
 10. Id. 
 11.   See, e.g., Marion Crain, Arm’s Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 163, 180 (2011) (“Marriage and employment share a common 
status-based genealogy in master-servant law. The household model in which the master 
provided for and controlled his family and servants was transported to the pre-industrial 
workplace, and along with it assumptions about the proper order of things that were based 
upon custom and ideology. Like marriage, work was seen as ‘enabling and redemptive,’ ‘a 
source of spiritual or secular enhancement of the self.’ Both marriage and employment 
initially emphasized ‘bonds of loyalty, subservience, and one-directional joint endeavor.’ 
Both represented an amalgam of contract and status that defined the ‘total legal situation of 
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Nonetheless, the view that work law might best be understood as a 
species of contract law has some prima facie plausibility. For example, 
what we refer to as “labor law” constitutes a major component of work law, 
and it governs the formation and activities of unions, which exist in large 
part to negotiate contracts between unionized workers and management. 
Similarly, “employment law” is another significant component of work 
law, and it governs relationships between employers and employees, which 
are typically entered via contractual or quasi-contractual agreements. In 
short, when people work for a salary or wages, they typically agree to a 
bargain specifying that they will provide labor in exchange for money and 
other valuable consideration – the quintessential elements of a contract at 
common law. So it is understandable that some might believe the most 
important aspect of work law concerns the contracts through which 
employers and employees enter work relationships and specify some of 
their terms. 
However, viewing work law as merely ancillary to an overarching 
body of contract law – which it “restrains” – is deeply mistaken. At best, 
this is a stiflingly narrow view that ignores the many ways in which work 
law supersedes or functions alongside the law of contracts. At worst, it is a 
category mistake. As I will discuss further in the next section, the roles of 
employer and employee are primarily defined by “status” rather than by 
“contract.” We have long understood “status” and “contract” as distinct 
from or even opposed to each other, but this conception can be misleading, 
as agreements governed by contract law all involve some sort of change in 
status. Accordingly, any purported distinction between status and contract 
must be viewed on a continuum rather than as stark opposites. Nonetheless, 
the work relationships formed when parties voluntarily agree to contracts 
of employment must inevitably skew toward the “status” side of the 
conceptual spectrum, as such contracts clearly involve accepting and 
assuming distinct statuses within a state-defined and -regulated institution. 
Consider again the comparison with marriage laws, which allow some 
modifications of the marriage relationship through prenuptial agreements 
and only recognize as valid those marriages that are entered voluntarily 
 
the individual.’ Though the parties might contract as to some terms, the background rules 
for the relationship were prescribed by custom and ultimately embedded in standard form 
contracts supplied by law (the at-will rule for American workers; the marriage contract for 
intimate relationships for which the parties sought formal legal recognition); ‘it was never 
contemplated that the parties would design their own relationship.’”) (citing Mary Ann 
Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53 TULANE L. REV. 697, 698-99 (1979); 
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 13-14 (1983)) 
(quoting PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 54 (1969); ALAN FOX, 
BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER & TRUST RELATIONS 185 (1974)). 
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through signed agreements by both parties. The foregoing are important 
elements of marriage law. But they do nothing to change the fact that once 
one has agreed to enter a marriage, one thereby takes on the status of 
spouse in a legally defined relationship, most of the features of which 
cannot be altered by contract. For example, spouses typically cannot sue 
each other during marriage for anything other than divorce, spouses cannot 
be forced to testify against each other in court, and spouses have mutual 
obligations to support each other during marriage that cannot be 
contractually waived or altered. 
Accordingly, courts have long recognized that marriage is primarily a 
relationship of status, despite its gradual incorporation of contractual 
elements. For example, in 1888, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that, “at 
common law, marriage as a status had few elements of contract about it.”12 
Since 1888, of course, we have abolished the laws of coverture and enacted 
civil rights legislation protecting the rights of women, and the law no 
longer sees the parties to a marriage relationship as “merged into one.” 
However, despite the greatly increased “independence” of the parties to 
modern-day marriage contracts, 21st-Century courts continue to reaffirm the 
essentially status-based nature of the marriage relationship. For example, in 
its landmark 2003 decision holding that same-sex couples have the right to 
marry under the Massachusetts Constitution, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion cited to DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 13, 31, 
762 N.E.2d 797 (2002), which stated that “marriage is not a mere contract 
between two parties but a legal status from which certain rights and 
obligations arise.”13 Yet, more recently, the federal District Court for the 
Northern District of California held in Perry v. Schwarzenegger that the 
U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage.14 
 
 12. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210, 213 (1888) (holding that “marriage is not a 
contract within the meaning of. . . [the Commerce Clause]”) (“For instance, no other 
contract merged the legal existence of the parties into one. Other distinctive elements will 
readily suggest themselves, which rob it of most of its characteristics as a contract, and 
leave it simply as a status or institution. As such, it is not so much the result of private 
agreement, as of public ordination. In every enlightened government, it is preeminently the 
basis of civil institutions, and thus an object of the deepest public concern. In this light, 
marriage is more than a contract. It is not a mere matter of pecuniary consideration. It is a 
great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 13. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003). 
 14. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Marriage 
requires two parties to give their free consent to form a relationship, which then forms the 
foundation of a household. The spouses must consent to support each other and any 
dependents. The state regulates marriage because marriage creates stable households, which 
in turn form the basis of a stable, governable populace. . . . The evidence shows that the 
movement of marriage away from a gendered institution and toward an institution free from 
state-mandated gender roles reflects an evolution in the understanding of gender rather than 
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As the foregoing legal opinions attest, although the state-sanctioned 
marriage relationship can only be entered by two parties’ consenting to sign 
a marriage contract, courts and judges have long seen this contractual 
element of the relationship as a mere formality in comparison with its core 
nature and function as a state-defined institution conferring a “marital 
status” on those parties who choose to participate in it. 
Similarly, when two parties consent to enter a work relationship via an 
employment contract, they thereby agree to do so and set some of the terms 
of the relationship, but work law defines and regulates the relationship so 
that many of its essential features cannot be altered by contract. For 
example, if two parties purport to enter an employment contract, but the 
putative “employee” meets, instead, the legal definition of an “independent 
contractor,” the putative “employer” cannot be held vicariously liable for a 
variety of torts committed by the “employee” in the course of her work for 
the “employer,” even if the “employer” implicitly or explicitly agrees to 
assume such liability in the contract. More frequently, a hiring party will 
purport to agree to a contract for services with an “independent contractor” 
while nonetheless retaining the sort of control over the worker that is 
definitive of an employment relationship. In such cases, courts have held 
that even though the hiring party did not explicitly agree to enter an 
employment relationship and assume the rights and obligations associated 
therewith, the nature of its relationship with the purported “independent 
contractor” – no matter how it is described in the contract – unavoidably 
constitutes an employer-employee relationship in the eyes of the law. Thus, 
even though contractual attempts to execute an “end run” around the 
provisions of work law are common – and all too often successful despite 
their illegality – they are prohibited by law and will be declared void if 
discovered. 
Moreover, most of the laws governing the day-to-day interactions 
between workers and employers have little to do with contracts. In practice, 
most employment litigation is prosecuted on behalf of aggrieved employees 
– interestingly, very few employers sue their employees to enforce their 
rights qua employer, preferring simply to fire any employees who displease 
them – and employee plaintiffs typically do not sue their employers to 
enforce their contractual rights. Instead, they much more commonly seek 
to enforce rights guaranteed to them by local, state, and federal statutes. For 
example, common employee-initiated lawsuits based on work law statutes 
include causes of action for discrimination based on race, sex, disability, 
age, or religion; sexual harassment; wage and hour claims, including those 
based on allegations that workers have been misclassified as “independent 
 
a change in marriage.”). 
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contractors” rather than “employees”; and employer retaliation against 
whistleblowers or employees who have attempted to enforce their 
statutorily guaranteed rights. 
Accordingly, we could plausibly suggest that it is principally through 
such statutes and other elements of work law – rather than the law of 
contracts – that the U.S. and other common law jurisdictions regulate work 
relationships. In response, Horacio Spector and others sympathetic to the 
freedom-of-contract view might argue that these statutes should 
nonetheless be viewed as part of contract law since they principally 
function as restraints on freedom of contract. However, in addition to its 
straightforward inaccuracy, this line of reasoning is problematic in that it 
implies that we should conceive of a great many distinct bodies of law as 
somehow ancillary to – or mere “branches” of – contract law. For example, 
it is a matter of blackletter law that any contractual provision involving 
illegal subject matter is unenforceable, so all statutes that make any sort of 
conduct illegal thereby function as restraints on contract by making 
putative contracts involving the illegal conduct unenforceable. Thus, 
statutes prohibiting murder indisputably constrain freedom of contract by 
rendering unenforceable any contractual agreement to commit murder. But 
to view criminal laws principally as means to limit the enforceable subject 
matter of contracts is obviously misguided. By analogy, it seems similarly 
misguided to view work law as no more than a specialized branch of 
contract law. 
The freedom-of-contract view’s focus on external aspects of work 
relationships distorts the primary purpose of work law by neglecting its 
function of regulating the ongoing nature of the relationship between 
employer and employee in the workplace, over the course of performing 
the contract. This is a mistake because the core of work law concerns this 
ongoing relationship. The view I will defend in this dissertation more 
accurately conceives of work law as specifying and regulating the content 
of the relationship. This relationship is one of governance, in which the 
employer is understood and permitted to exercise authority over the 
employee. Indeed, we might plausibly see work law as providing a 
constitution for a sort of private government that persists within the 
workplace, much as it has since work law was more commonly called the 
law of “master and servant.” I will discuss and defend this view of the 
workplace as a zone of private governance below. In the next section, 
however, I will explore and critically evaluate the ideology that arguably 
motivates the freedom-of-contract view. 
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III. MOTIVATIONS FOR THE FREEDOM-OF-CONTRACT VIEW 
A. Maine’s “From Status to Contract” 
It is widely accepted among social scientists and legal theorists that 
Sir Henry Maine was largely correct when he wrote in 1861 that “the 
movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from 
status to contract.”15 This pronouncement may have contributed to the 
enthusiasm of the late 19th-century “freedom of contract” movement, and it 
is not surprising that many people took it as an optimistic projection of the 
future, associating “status” with serfdom or slavery and “contract” with 
liberty and individual choice. Most importantly for my purposes, the 
freedom-of-contract view is arguably rooted in an ideology inspired, at 
least in part, by Maine’s status-to-contract hypothesis. Accordingly, I will 
examine it closely, and I encourage readers who are unfamiliar with the 
text to read the substantial excerpt quoted in my preceding footnoted 
 
 15. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, From Status to Contract, in ANCIENT LAW, ITS 
CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 99, 
99-100 (1917) (“The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one 
respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family 
dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily 
substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account. The advance has 
been accomplished at varying rates of celerity, and there are societies not absolutely 
stationary in which the collapse of the ancient organisation can only be perceived by careful 
study of the phenomena they present. But, whatever its pace, the change has not been 
subject to reaction or recoil, and apparent retardations will be found to have been 
occasioned through the absorption of archaic ideas and customs from some entirely foreign 
source. Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by 
degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. 
It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which 
all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have 
steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the 
free agreement of Individuals. In Western Europe the progress achieved in this direction has 
been considerable. Thus the status of the Slave has disappeared – it has been superseded by 
the contractual relation of the servant to his master. The status of the Female under 
Tutelage, if the tutelage be understood of persons other than her husband, has also ceased to 
exist; from her coming of age to her marriage all the relations she may form are relations of 
contract. . . . The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula expressing 
the law of progress thus indicated, which, whatever be its value, seems to me to be 
sufficiently ascertained. All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were 
derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently 
residing in the Family. If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best 
writers, to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such 
conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the 
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract.”). 
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citation to Maine’s Ancient Law.16 
As this passage illustrates, Maine clearly endorses the “movement 
from Status to Contract” as an “advance [that] has been accomplished” 
rather than merely describing it in the form of an observation about social 
and legal change. That is, Maine means both to describe a trend he 
observes in modern legal systems and to endorse the trend as “progress.” 
It’s not clear whether he thinks this positive change is in some sense 
inevitable, but he does claim to have identified “a formula expressing the 
law of progress” underlying the movement from status to contract.17 
Perhaps we should understand this invocation of “law” as the claim that his 
“formula” expresses the best or only way to achieve progress, or 
alternatively, that some law of human nature will always push human 
societies to progress in the way he describes.18 Note also that Maine defines 
the dichotomy he suggests in the excerpt’s closing paragraph by asserting 
that if we can call all “personal conditions” arising from the family 
“Status,” we can then refer to all those connections that arise by agreement 
as “Contract.”19 This division allows for the possibility that connections 
will be “coloured by” the previous rights and obligations provided by 
Status, but he suggests that the more we can abandon such “archaic ideas 
and customs” and move toward purely contractual relations, the better.20 
There are various problems with Maine’s suggestion, including the 
difficulty of separating the deeply intertwined influences of Status and 
Contract. Indeed, it is ironic that Maine insists on explicitly including both 
the master-servant and marriage relations in the broad move toward 
contract, since his discussion of these relations simultaneously 
demonstrates that these are among the most problematic cases for his 
“formula” to explain. In his description of work relations, he argues that the 
“status of the Slave. . . has been superseded by the contractual relation of 
the servant to his master.”21 Why “to his master” instead of “with a 
master”? If Maine hoped to portray this supersession as a laudable move 
toward a relation between free and equal contractors, he shouldn’t have 
described it in terms that make clear the hierarchical and status-based 
nature of the master-servant relation. To illustrate, it is evident that we 
could easily describe the “buyer-seller” relation in neutral terms that imply 
nothing about hierarchy or status, e.g., a buyer contracts with a seller to pay 
money for goods. In contrast, it would sound neither neutral nor intuitively 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. [emphasis added] 
 18. Id. at 100. 
 19. Id. 
 20.  Id. at 99. 
 21. Id. at 100. 
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correct to say that she enters a “contractual relation of the buyer to her 
seller.” 
Similarly, when Maine discusses marriage, he explains that the “status 
of the Female under Tutelage, if the tutelage be understood of persons other 
than her husband, has also ceased to exist; from her coming of age to her 
marriage all the relations she may form are relations of contract.”22 As Nora 
Flum argues, Maine simply can’t pretend that married women of his era 
could be viewed as entities who were separable from their status.23 
Furthermore, as Maine was surely aware, life as an unmarried woman – in 
his time and long thereafter – typically did not offer significant freedom, 
contractual or otherwise. A former sociology professor of mine once 
asserted in lecture that the reason the father of the bride traditionally “gives 
her away” during the wedding ceremony is “so that the woman is always 
under male supervision.”24 I’m not sure to what extent her assertion is 
historically or culturally accurate, but it sounds roughly right to me as a 
plausible explanation of the tradition as it persists today, and I suspect it 
would have seemed obviously right to Maine and his contemporaries. 
B. Where Maine Went Wrong 
Notwithstanding its substantial influence, Maine’s hypothesis has also 
been the subject of sustained and frequent criticism.  For example, legal 
academic Nathan Isaacs writes as follows in a 1917 article in the Yale Law 
Journal: 
The formula has generally been gratefully accepted as a very 
useful summary of many phenomena encountered in legal 
history. . . . Now and then the formula has been modified or 
limited, or exceptions to it have been noted; then the universality 
of the doctrines began to be questioned; and finally its 
applicability to Anglo-American law has been categorically 
denied.25 
Isaacs correctly attributes the above-referenced “categorical denial” to 
Roscoe Pound, then-dean of Harvard Law School, who was a prominent 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23. Nora Flum, Constituting Status: An Analysis of the Operation of Status in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 58, 61 (2011) (“Women were only free from 
status when they existed outside of a marriage relationship. Despite Maine’s desire to show 
that Western society had ascended to a purely contractual level, he was forced to concede 
that married women were prohibited from contract and thus existed in a status relationship 
within the family.”). 
 24.   Professor Phyllis Atwell, Lecture at Langara College, Vancouver, B.C. (1993). 
 25. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 34 (1917). 
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representative of the emerging school of thought known as “legal realism” 
or “sociological jurisprudence.”26  Pound did, indeed, argue that Maine’s 
purported historical insight constituted little more than his endorsement of 
a short-lived and anachronistic phase of 19th-Century jurisprudence, and 
explicitly asserted that Maine’s formula had “no basis in Anglo-American 
legal history.”27  Isaacs responds to this assertion by pointing to what he 
takes to be linguistic evidence supporting Maine’s formula: “‘Employer’ 
and ‘employee’ (words having reference to the contract) now seem more 
appropriate terms than the older ‘master’ and ‘servant’ (words having 
 
 26. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008) (“In 1931, Karl Llewellyn attempted to capture the empirical goals 
of the legal realists by referring to early ‘efforts . . . to capitalize the wealth of our reported 
cases to make large-scale quantitative studies of facts and outcome.’ Llewellyn emphasized 
‘the hope . . . that these might develop lines of prediction more sure, or at least capable of 
adding further certainty to the predictions based as hitherto on intensive study of smaller 
bodies of cases.’ But Llewellyn added, with apparent embarrassment: ‘I know of no 
published results.’ . . . Llewellyn wrote in reaction to the formalist view that law, as 
expressed in statutes and precedents, determined the outcomes of particular cases.  He 
believed that, much of the time, existing law did not compel particular outcomes, False 
[a]nd at times, the law itself was contradictory: ‘[I]n any case doubtful enough to make 
litigation respectable[,] the available authoritative premises . . . are at least two, and [ ] the 
two are mutually contradictory as applied to the case at hand.’ For Llewellyn, the 
indeterminacy, sometimes even incoherence, of law meant that ‘the personality of the judge’ 
must to some degree explain case outcomes.”) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism 
about Realism – Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) at 1239-1242) 
(citing Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in MARTIN P. GOLDING AND WILLIAM A. 
EDMUNDSON, EDS, THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
(Blackwell 2005) at 50-52; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 
(1950) at 401-06)). 
 27. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 27-28 (1921) (“Puritanism, the 
attitude of protecting the individual against government and society which the common-law 
courts had taken in the contests with the crown, the eighteenth-century theory of the natural 
rights of the abstract individual man, the insistence of the pioneer upon a minimum of 
interference with his freedom of action, and the nineteenth-century deduction of law from a 
metaphysical principle of individual liberty – all these combined to make jurists and lawyers 
think of individuals rather than of groups or relations and to make jurists think ill of 
anything that had the look of the archaic institution of status. The Romanist idea of contract 
became the popular juristic idea and, as Maitland puts it, contract became ‘the greediest of 
legal categories.’ . . . This was furthered by the general acceptance . . . of [a] political 
interpretation of jurisprudence . . . which found the key to social and hence to legal progress 
in a gradual unfolding of the idea of individual liberty False It was furthered also by the 
famous generalization of Sir Henry Maine that the evolution of law is a progress from status 
to contract. . . . But in truth the dogma of Sir Henry Maine is a generalization from Roman 
legal history only. It shows the course of evolution of Roman law. On the other hand it has 
no basis in Anglo-American legal history, and the whole course of English and American 
law today is belying it, unless indeed, we are progressing backward.”). 
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reference to status).”28 
Isaacs’ half-hearted rhetorical gestures at terminological changes are 
not at all persuasive, especially since Isaacs refers to – and is therefore 
aware of – Pound’s much more cogent analysis of early 20th-Century 
developments in the laws regulating the work relationship.  Essentially, 
Pound demonstrates that rather than moving from status to contract, the 
legal system of his day was progressing in the opposite direction.29  Pound 
explains this change largely on the basis of what he takes to be a 
widespread rejection of the “liberty of contract” view of social legislation 
that had briefly taken hold of U.S. courts from the late 19th century to the 
early 20th.  In reaction to the Supreme Court’s repeatedly striking down 
laws aimed at regulating the work relationship during what is now called 
the Lochner era,30 many subsequent jurists and legislators focused their 
regulatory efforts on attaching more and more significance to the status of 
the parties to such relationships rather than the contracts by which they 
entered them.  Pound argues in the above-quoted passage that this more 
recent movement of the law not only demonstrated that the early 20th-
Century legal “progress” was from contract to status, but also that this was 
a return to the “spirit” of the traditional common law rather than a 
departure from it.31 
 
 28. Isaacs, supra note 25, at 35 (“Is there indeed ‘no basis in Anglo-American legal 
history’ for the status-to-contract theory as generally understood?  Its original application 
was to personal relations derived from or colored by the powers and privileges anciently 
residing in the family.  Is it not true that the relation of master and servant was originally – 
and still is nominally – a domestic relation?  And whether the nineteenth century was out of 
line with the common law or not, is it not a fact that it has made of this relation a contractual 
one?  ‘Employer’ and ‘employee’ (words having reference to the contract) now seem more 
appropriate terms than the older ‘master’ and ‘servant’ (words having reference to status).”). 
 29. Pound, supra note 27, at 29-31 (“[M]ore significant is the legislative development 
whereby duties and liabilities are imposed on the employer in the relation of employer and 
employee, not because he has so willed, not because he is at fault, but because the nature of 
the relation is deemed to call for it. Such is the settled tendency of the present. To me it 
seems a return to the common-law conception of the relation of master and servant, with 
reciprocal rights and duties and with liabilities imposed in view of the exigencies of the 
relation. . . . For it is not out of line with the common law to deal with causes where the 
relation of master and servant exists differently from causes where there is no such relation. 
It is not out of line to deal with such causes by determining the duties and the liabilities 
which shall flow from the relation. On the contrary, the nineteenth century was out of line 
with the common law when it sought to treat the relation of master and servant in any other 
way.”). 
 30.   Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that law limiting bakers’ hours 
of labor was unconstitutional because it interfered with “liberty of contract”).  Lochner was 
decided in 1905, but I follow convention in using “Lochner-era” to refer more generally to 
late 19th and early 20th-Century Supreme Court ideology and decisions. 
 31.   Pound, supra note 27, at 29-31. 
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I am persuaded by Pound’s explanation and reasoning in the above-
quoted passages that Maine’s status-to-contract formula has not merited the 
undue influence it has had on subsequent legal and social theory, in large 
part because it has not proved accurate in the intervening decades.  
Moreover, I believe that Pound’s argument against the applicability of 
Maine’s view also suggests an indictment of the freedom-of-contract view 
of work law.  I will expand on this contention in the next section. 
IV. WHY THE FREEDOM-OF-CONTRACT VIEW IS MISTAKEN 
A. Master and Servant 
West Publishing’s legal research website Westlaw.com provides 
access to myriad legal materials, including state and federal cases, law 
review articles, statutes, regulations, and transcripts of legislative debates.  
Westlaw also features West’s distinctive and proprietary “West Key 
Number System,” which organizes legal issues discussed in reported cases 
into major topics and – according to West Publishing – constitutes “the de 
facto classification system for all American law.”32  These topics provide 
titles for the “headnotes” which appear in many Westlaw cases and provide 
brief summaries of the issues discussed therein.  The Digest System’s 
topics are organized by numbers as well as titles.  Topic number 29, “Labor 
and Employment,” is especially interesting.  Whenever the Westlaw editors 
judge that an issue discussed in a case is pertinent to topic 29, they indicate 
this with a headnote, such as the following sample from the Westlaw 
version of a 2002 case decided by the Supreme Court of Texas: 
Labor and Employment 29 
231Hk29 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k5, 255k1 Master and Servant) 
The test to determine whether a worker is an “employee” rather 
than an “independent contractor” is whether the employer has the 
right to control the progress, details, and methods of operations 
of the work, because an employer controls not merely the end 
sought to be accomplished, but also the means and details of its 
accomplishment, with respect to the work of an employee.33 
This example provides a concise statement of the current and 
longstanding common law standard for determining whether a worker is an 
 
 32.   See, e.g., Thomson Reuters, Differences: WestlawNext Legal Research System, 
available at https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/wln2/L-373938_v3.pdf 
(2014).   
 33. Limestone Products Distribution, Inc., v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2002). 
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“employee” rather than an “independent contractor.”  As the headnote 
makes clear, the key element in the test for employee status is presence or 
absence of the employer’s “right to control . . . the work of an employee.”34  
This may sound familiar to the attentive reader, as I briefly mentioned the 
“right to control” test in my discussion in Section II of lawsuits based on 
the claim that employees have been misclassified by their employers as 
“independent contractors.”  As I explained in that discussion, when the 
plaintiffs prevail in such lawsuits, the law requires courts to hold that it is 
the nature of the relationship – not the terms set forth in the contract – that 
determine whether a given worker is an “employee” or an “independent 
contractor” in the eyes of the law.  This alone seems to give us a reason to 
reject the freedom-of-contract view. 
Moreover, the headnote implies that the relationship in question has 
been defined by the same “right to control” test for quite some time, as it 
notes parenthetically that the content of the current section 231Hk29 of 
topic 29, which sets forth the test, was previously listed as sections 255k5 
and 255k1 of a subject area titled “Master and Servant.”  From its inception 
in 1910 until the late 20th Century, West’s Digest System referred to the 
body of law governing work relationships as the law of “Master and 
Servant.”  I have referred to the “master-servant” relation several times in 
previous sections, especially in my discussions of Maine’s formula and 
Pound’s criticism thereof, and I suspect that this term for the work 
relationship strikes most of us as outdated and unappealing – nobody wants 
to think of herself as a “servant” toiling for a “master.”  Fortunately for our 
modern sensibilities – but unfortunately perhaps for sociological clarity and 
historical understanding – West and other legal commentators largely 
abandoned the old terminology in the latter half of the 20th century.  As the 
above headnote indicates, West’s Digest topic “Master and Servant” 
became “Labor and Employment,” and – as Isaacs was quick to point out in 
his defense of Maine’s formula – the roles of “master” and “servant” 
became “employer” and “employee.”  However euphonious these changes 
in terminology might be, it seems clear that according to the understanding 
of work law advanced by the editors of West’s Digest System, the new 
names were appended to existing roles rather than to newly created ones. 
These roles – whether “master” and “servant” or “employer” and 
“employee” – are clearly better conceived as designations of status rather 
than creations of the agreements between free and independent contractors.  
I hold that the main aim of work law has long been and continues to be the 
legal recognition and regulation of hierarchical relationships in which the 
“master” is understood and permitted to exercise a significant right of 
 
 34. Id. 
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control over the “servant.”  This uncomfortable reality is obviously in 
tension with Maine’s view of progressive modernity as moving “from 
status to contract.”35  While there is undoubtedly some truth to Maine’s 
generalization, the work relationship is one of several important exceptions 
to its applicability.  This is because work law provides work relationships 
with much of their default – and in many cases, mandatory – content, such 
that many or even most aspects of the work relationship are governed by 
non-contracted terms of work law rather than bargained-for results of 
negotiation between two independent parties. 
For example, many substantive rights and obligations attach to the 
employer-employee relation – such as those requiring minimum wages, 
maximum hours, and the employer’s provision of worker’s compensation 
and unemployment insurance – and employers often seek to avoid these 
obligations by inducing workers to agree to work as purported 
“independent contractors.”  But work law prohibits this practice by 
defining and identifying work relationships in its own mandatory terms, 
which cannot lawfully be waived by contract.  Thus, one’s rights and 
obligations as a party to a work relationship are mostly determined by 
one’s status – i.e., whether one meets the legal definition of a “master” or a 
“servant” – rather than by contract.  And therefore, the freedom-of-contract 
view is as deeply mistaken, and for many of the same reasons, as Maine’s 
status-to-contract formula.  At the risk of appearing glib, I’ll venture that 
the body of law in question just does not work that way. 
B. Blackstone 
As I argue above, the roots of modern work law in the master-servant 
relation provide compelling reasons to reject the freedom-of-contract view.  
This is because the master-servant relation is clearly one of status rather 
than contract, and it requires that the parties to it accept status-based roles 
within a hierarchical governance relationship.  To illustrate this point in 
more detail, I will now turn to a discussion of the 18th-Century master-
servant relation as described in Sir William Blackstone’s 1759 treatise 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
It is difficult to overstate the influence of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
especially in the United States.36  As Amy Dru Stanley explains – after 
 
 35. Maine, supra note 15, at 100. 
 36.   See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-
19 (1996); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 465 (1909) (“Until a 
comparatively recent date, all legal education, whether in school or in office, began with the 
study of Blackstone. Probably all serious office study begins with Blackstone or some 
American imitator to-day.  Many schools make Blackstone the first subject of instruction to-
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referring to the Commentaries as “the most influential legal treatise in the 
Anglo-American world of the late eighteenth century” – the pioneering 
lawyers who brought the common law to the New World in the 18th 
century didn’t have the luxury of acquiring or transporting extensive 
libraries of legal tomes, but they could easily carry the two-volume 
Commentaries on a mule or wagon and count on it to offer an answer to 
nearly any question about the common law they might encounter.37  
Accordingly, Blackstone became, perhaps as much as a matter of 
convenience as of respect for his work, even more influential in America 
than in his native country.  Note, however, that I do not emphasize the 
influence of his treatise in order to bolster its credibility as an accurate 
description of the “laws of England” in Blackstone’s day.  Instead, I mean 
to suggest that Blackstone’s Commentaries had a perhaps inordinately 
powerful effect on what most jurists and lawyers believed about the 
common law – especially in America – whether or not all, most, or few of 
his pronouncements were accurate.  Accordingly, it is worthwhile to look at 
what Blackstone said about the law of master and servant in order to trace 
its influences on modern work law. 
The England of Blackstone’s time was marked by a meticulously-
ordered hierarchy of social statuses and titles, and Blackstone explains at 
length how the various sorts of nobility and “commonalty” – i.e., all those 
persons who lacked clerical or noble rank – were ranked and esteemed.38  
After extensive discussion of the ranks of the nobility, Blackstone moves 
on to discuss the commonalty: “The commonalty, like the nobility, are 
divided into several degrees; and, as the lords, though different in rank, yet 
all of them are peers in respect of their nobility, so the commoners, though 
some are greatly superior to others, yet all are in law peers, in respect of 
their want of nobility.”39 
Blackstone then describes in great detail the various sorts of knights, 
 
day, and in others Blackstone is a subject of examination for admission or of prescribed 
reading after admission, or there are courses on elementary law in which texts reproducing 
the theories of the introduction to and the first book of the Commentaries are the basis of 
instruction.”). 
 37. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND 
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 7 (1998). 
 38. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, *397  (1759) 
(“The civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty. Of the nobility, the peerage of 
Great Britain, or lords temporal, as forming (together with the bishops) one of the supreme 
branches of the legislature, I have before sufficiently spoken: we are here to consider them 
according to their several degrees, or titles of honour. All degrees of nobility and honour are 
derived from the king as their fountain: and he may institute what new titles he pleases. 
Hence it is that all degrees of nobility are not of equal antiquity. Those now in use are 
dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts, and barons.”). 
 39. Id. at *403. 
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including knights of the garter, knights banneret, knights of the bath, and 
knights bachelors.40  These are the highest-ranking members of the 
“commonalty,” according to Blackstone and his contemporaries, and their 
titles are “names of dignity.”  He then offers a summary of the remaining 
ranks of the commonalty.41 
Notably, “gentleman” was a title of respect and status among the 
commonalty, and this status could be attained by anyone with a university 
education and enough income or wealth to “live idly, and without manual 
labour.”42  Anyone who fulfilled these requirements and could carry 
himself with the bearing of a gentleman “shall be called master.”43  This 
makes plain what we might have assumed in any case, namely, that 
“master” has never been a mere designation of the party who happens to be 
issuing the orders in a given master-servant pairing.  Instead, “master” is a 
“name of worship” that is reserved for those members of the commonalty 
who have enough education and noble bearing to function in polite society, 
and enough money to “live idly, and without manual labour.”44  The second 
noteworthy detail is that the last sentence of the preceding quoted passage45 
is all Blackstone has to say about those members of the commonalty who 
fell below the rank of knights, esquires, or gentlemen: “The rest of the 
commonalty are tradesmen, artificers, and labourers.”46 
Thus, in a chapter titled “Of the Civil State,” Blackstone describes the 
“master” as an educated gentleman who is wealthy enough to dress 
properly and live idly.47  Although he has little to say about the socially 
undistinguished “rest of the commonalty” in that chapter, he has much 
more to say about these industrious, non-idle persons in the context in 
which Blackstone and his fellow gentlemen presumably valued them most, 
namely, in his chapter titled “Of Master and Servant.”48 
 
 40.   Id. 
 41. Id. at *404-07 (“These, Sir Edward Coke says, are all the names of dignity in this 
kingdom, esquires and gentlemen being only names of worship. But before these last the 
heralds rank all colonels, serjeants at law, and doctors in the three learned professions. . . . 
As for gentlemen, says Sir Thomas Smith, they be made good cheap in this kingdom: for 
whosoever studieth the laws of the realm, who studieth in the universities, who professeth 
the liberal sciences, and, to be short, who can live idly, and without manual labour, and will 
bear the port, charge, and countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called master, and shall 
be taken for a gentleman. . . . The rest of the commonalty are tradesmen, artificers, and 
labourers False”). 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   See note 41, supra. 
 46. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, *407. 
 47.   Id. 
 48. Id. at *422. 
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Blackstone describes the master-servant relation as one of three great 
relations in private life,49 which is not at all consistent with the standard 
freedom-of-contract view of employment as an arms-length arrangement 
that is separate from home and family.50  In Blackstone’s time, servants 
were considered members of their masters’ households, and many 
interesting consequences followed from the domestic nature of the relation. 
First, Blackstone explains that the master of a household was not only 
in charge of his wife, children, servants, and other inferiors, but also 
responsible for most torts committed by them.  This – which obviously 
describes the 18th-Century precursor to the modern rule of respondeat 
superior or vicarious liability – followed because the other members of the 
master’s household were viewed by the law as extensions of his person, 
under his care, and among his many responsibilities.51 
The master’s responsibility for the actions of his servants or other 
members of his household also extended to any business they might 
transact in accordance with his orders or in cases in which the master did 
not explicitly order or authorize the transaction, but third parties might 
reasonably believe that the servants were acting at the master’s behest.52 
The master, accordingly, was quite generally held responsible for the 
 
 49.   Id. (“The three great relations in private life are, 1. That of master and servant; 
which is founded in convenience, whereby a man is directed to call in the assistance of 
others, where his own skill and labor will not be sufficient to answer the cares incumbent 
upon him. 2. That of husband and wife; which is founded in nature, but modified by civil 
society: the one directing man to continue and multiply his species, the other prescribing the 
manner in which that natural impulse must be confined and regulated. 3. That of parent and 
child, which is consequential to that of marriage, being its principal end and design: and it is 
by virtue of this relation that infants are protected, maintained, and educated.”) 
 50.   See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 
1542 (2006) (citing IRVING BROWNE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND 
OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYED (1883); JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY AND 
MASTER AND SERVANT (1905)) (“The American employment system originated from British 
master-and-servant law. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, work relations 
were based on the idea of prolonged status-based, and in some cases involuntary, servitude. 
Legal historians of the pre-industrial era describe employment as akin to family relations, in 
which status defined and determined relationships and powers.”). 
 51. Blackstone, supra note 46, at *431-32 (“A master is, lastly, chargeable if any of his 
family layeth or casteth any thing out of his house into the street or common highway, to the 
damage of any individual, or the common nuisance of his majesty’s liege people: for the 
master hath the superintendence and charge of all his household.”). 
 52. Id. at *430 (“[W]hatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course of [the 
master’s] business, is equivalent to a general command. . . . A wife, a friend, a relation, that 
use to transact business for a man, are quoad hoc [i.e., to this extent] his servants; and the 
principal must answer for their conduct: for the law implies, that they act under a general 
command; and without such a doctrine as this no mutual intercourse between man and man 
could subsist with any tolerable convenience.”). 
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acts of all those who were part of his household and therefore “under his 
charge.”53  It is noteworthy that the master’s wife, friend, or other relations 
could sometimes be viewed as “servants” in this context.  Apparently, all 
and any members of the master’s household were seen to be at his service 
and working for his purposes, so if they caused damage or transacted 
business, the master could be held responsible.  Again, this general doctrine 
survives in the modern common law rule of respondeat superior, according 
to which an agent’s principal – often, though not always, the employer of 
an employee – may be held liable for torts of the agent committed while 
acting for the principal or for business transacted by the agent on the 
principal’s behalf. 
Blackstone discusses various classes of servants, including menial 
servants, apprentices, labourers, and “superior” servants, “such as stewards, 
factors, and bailiffs.”54  But the first sort of servant he discusses is the 
slave.55  According to Blackstone, in his time one could agree to “sell 
oneself” to another as a servant, so long as the agreement did not purport to 
give the master power over the servant’s life and liberty.56  Such an 
agreement could and did, however, give the master a property interest in 
the servant – or at least, in certain of his services – as Blackstone states 
explicitly in his discussion of the master-servant relation, explaining that 
“[t]he reason and foundation upon which all this doctrine is built, seem to 
be the property that every man has in the service of his domestics; acquired 
by the contract of hiring, and purchased by giving them wages.”57 
This, to me, is the most striking passage in the chapter.  Blackstone 
makes clear that the master has an interest – a property interest, no less – in 
 
 53.  Id. at *431. 
 54. Id. at *425-27. 
 55. Id. at *423 (“I have formerly observed that pure and proper slavery does not, nay, 
cannot, subsist in England: such, I mean, whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given 
to the master over the life and fortune of the slave. . . . But, secondly, it is said that slavery 
may begin ‘jure civili;’ when one man sells himself to  another. This, if only meant of 
contracts to serve or work for another, is very just: but when applied to strict slavery, in the 
sense of the laws of old Rome or modern Barbary, is also impossible.”). 
 56.   Id. 
 57. Blackstone, supra note 46, at *429 (emphasis added) (“A master likewise may 
justify an assault in defense of his servant, and a servant in defense of his master: the 
master, because he has an interest in his servant, not to be deprived of his service; the 
servant, because it is part of his duty, for which he receives his wages, to stand by and 
defend his master. Also if any person do hire or retain my servant, being in my service, for 
which the servant departeth from me and goeth to serve the other, I may have an action for 
damages against both the new master and the servant, or either of them False The reason 
and foundation upon which all this doctrine is built, seem to be the property that every man 
has in the service of his domestics; acquired by the contract of hiring, and purchased by 
giving them wages.”). 
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the “service of his domestics,” such that he would be justified in assaulting 
a third party in order to defend his servant, thereby protecting the property 
interest in that servant which he acquired upon hiring and purchased with 
wages.58  The servant, on the other hand, takes on a duty to “stand by and 
defend his master” whenever he is in danger – presumably the master’s 
right to expect this duty is purchased along with his property interest in the 
servant, though not as a result of arms-length contracting.59  Instead, 
Blackstone’s explanation shows that English law in his day assumed that 
every master acquired a property interest in every servant by paying wages, 
and every servant took on the duty to protect his master in the event of 
danger by accepting wages. 
This assumption, in turn, makes plain that Blackstone and his 
contemporaries did not use “master” and “servant” as mere descriptions of 
particular roles in a workplace, but rather as designators of status.  The 
servant, needless to say, had lower status than the master in all contexts: in 
the hierarchy of the master’s household, field, or factory; in English 
society; and in the eyes of the law.  This last inferiority of status is starkly 
illustrated by the law’s provision that a servant who struck a master would 
receive harsh punishment, while a master who struck a servant would only 
be “punished,” if at all, by the servant’s gaining the right to depart from the 
master’s service.60 
Luckily, this rule has not been preserved in modern work law, but 
many other influences of the master-servant relation have remained with 
us.61  As I discussed above, the modern rule of respondeat superior or 
vicarious liability is based on similar doctrines in the law of master and 
servant.62  The modern “master” no longer has a cause of action against 
another master who hires away his servant, but modern work law does 
provide for a very general duty on the part of the employee to obey the 
employer’s orders, within certain limits, and not to act against the 
employer’s interests while in his employ.  Most importantly, however, the 
modern master/employer retains, by definition, a broad right of control 
over the servant/employee. I will discuss this right of control in depth in the 
next subsection.  
 
 58.  Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at *428 (“A master may by law correct his apprentice for negligence or other 
misbehaviour, so it be done with moderation: though, if the master or master’s wife beats 
any other servant of full age, it is good cause of departure. But if any servant, workman, or 
labourer, assaults his master or dame, he shall suffer one year’s imprisonment, and other 
open corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb.”). 
 61.   I will discuss these remaining influences at length in the subsequent subsection 
“C,” infra. 
 62.   Blackstone, supra note 46. 
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C. Modern Law 
Against the status-laden backdrop provided by Blackstone’s picture of 
the master-servant relationship, we can consider the ideal contract-based 
model toward which modernization – according to Maine, Isaacs, and 
many other scholars – promises to lead us.  Recall Maine’s approbation of 
this welcome trend when he observes, “Starting from one terminus of 
history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are 
summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved 
towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the 
free agreement of Individuals.”63  As Amy Dru Stanley explains, this 
sentiment was much in line with the thinking of other 19th century 
American thinkers.64 
This is undoubtedly appealing, especially when one contrasts this 
picture of freedom with the evils of serfdom or slavery.  But how accurate 
is this picture?  Are “employees,” as they are defined in modern work law, 
considered or treated as free and independent contractors? 
The answer is a resounding and unequivocal “no.” In fact, the 
definition of “employee” under both the common law and statutory law of 
work is now and has long been, essentially, “one who works under the 
control and authority of another and is not an independent contractor.”65 
Noah Zatz expounds upon the rule defining “employee” as follows: 
Most federal employment statutes contain brief, vague, and often 
circular definitions of the related concepts of employee, 
employer, and employment.”). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 
(f), 2000e-2(a) (2000) (defining an “employee” as “an individual 
employed by an employer” and an employer as “a person . . . 
who has . . . employees”). The Supreme Court has held that, 
absent specific provisions to the contrary, such definitions 
incorporate the common-law test for employment developed in 
agency law. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
322-23 (1992). This test emphasizes “the hiring party’s right to 
control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished.” Id. at 323 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-
 
 63. Maine, supra note 15, at 99. 
 64. Stanley, supra note 37, at 7 (“In revolutionary America the dominant conception of 
covenant no longer was a relation of submission and dominion premised on protection and 
obedience. Rather, it suggested a voluntary association created by citizens equal under the 
law, a compact guaranteeing inalienable individual rights as well as the private contract 
relations arising from those rights.”). 
 65.  See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the 
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 871 n. 50 (2008) 
(defining loosely the relationship between employee, employer, and employment). 
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Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989)); accord Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445-46 
(2003).”).66 
As Justice Souter observes in the Darden opinion Zatz references, the 
standard statutory “definition of ‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed 
by an employer’ . . . is completely circular and explains nothing.”67 The 
Court’s solution to these circular definitions has consistently been to hold 
that whenever courts are called upon to construe the meaning of such 
definitions, they must apply the common law definition derived from the 
law of master and servant. The preceding sentence may look suspiciously 
like the sort of “ambitious” interpretation one might be tempted to advance 
in order to suit one’s pet thesis, but there is no ambiguity in this unanimous 
holding – i.e., all nine Justices voted for it – which follows a long line of 
cases affirming the same rule.68 
There are two especially noteworthy aspects of the Court’s above-
cited definitions of “employee” that I’d like to point out. First, notice that 
the common-law definition of the term “employee” endorsed by U.S. 
courts is derived from the law of agency, not contract.69 Second, the 
preceding quote is from Darden (1992), which quotes Reid (1989), which 
in turn cites Kelley (1974), Baker (1959), and Robinson (1915). These 
Supreme Court cases – which constitute binding authority over every court 
in the United States – spanning nearly a century are all cited as precedent 
for the same holding: When Congress does not define “employee” in a 
statute, courts construing the statute should apply the test for “the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law 
agency doctrine.”70 
Moreover, Congress has consistently endorsed the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its legislative intent in two clear ways. First, Congress 
continues to use circular and uninformative definitions of “employee” – 
e.g., “any individual employed by an employer.”71 This is so despite the 
fact that Congress – or at least, the lawyers advising them – is doubtless 
 
 66. Id.  
 67. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). 
 68. Id. at 322-23 (“In the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without 
defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine. See, e.g., Kelley v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1974); Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 
U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 
(1915).” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989))). 
 69. Id. (referencing “the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 323 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)). 
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aware that the Court regards such definitions as “circular.” Moreover, the 
Court has clearly expressed that wherever Congress makes use of such 
definitions, the Court will interpret that as Congressional intent to continue 
endorsing the traditional common-law understanding of “the conventional 
master-servant relationship.”72 Following the Court’s lead, I infer that if 
Congress had any desire to endorse a different standard, it would stop using 
the same non-explanatory “definition.” 
Second, as the Darden Court notes in support of its continuing 
endorsement of the common-law understanding of the master-servant 
relationship, on those rare occasions – the Darden opinion cites only two – 
when the Court has presumed to interpret a statutory definition as departing 
from the common-law test, Congress has “overruled” the Court’s 
interpretation by amending the statute to make it clear that Congress did, in 
fact, intend to statutory definition in question to conform to the traditional 
common-law test. Thus, Congress has never strayed from the traditional 
“master-servant” understanding of employment, and on the two occasions 
in which the Supreme Court attempted to stray therefrom, Congress 
“reigned in” the Justices’ expanded interpretation.73 
And the Supreme Court has not changed its view since issuing its 
opinion in Darden. In 2003, when the Court next had occasion to construe 
a statutory definition of “employee,” in the case of Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells,74 the Court did what anyone 
familiar with its past decisions on the matter would expect it to do: It 
affirmed Darden by quoting Darden’s quotation of Reid.75 
Incidentally, the Court does not perpetually quote itself in these cases 
out of laziness – the Justices do not seem averse to writing extremely long 
opinions – but rather to signal that it is affirming its prior holdings without 
modification. In other words, the cases indicate that the rule has been 
exactly the same for a long time – at least since 1915 – and the Court is 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 324-25 (“But Hearst and Silk, which interpreted ‘employee’ for purposes of 
the National Labor Relations Act and Social Security Act, respectively, are feeble 
precedents for unmooring the term from the common law. In each case, the Court read 
“employee,” which neither statute helpfully defined, to imply something broader than the 
common-law definition; after each opinion, Congress amended the statute so construed to 
demonstrate that the usual common-law principles were the keys to meaning.” (citing 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 
(1947))). 
 74. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). 
 75. Id. at 444-45 (“Quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-740, we explained that ‘when 
Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that 
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine.’” (quoting Darden, 508 U.S. at 323))). 
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showing no inclination to change it in the foreseeable future. 
The Clackamas case is also interesting because it presented a novel 
question, namely, how to distinguish an “employee” from a “partner.” 
Recall for a moment the misclassification lawsuits I briefly mentioned – 
and will return to in a moment – earlier in this chapter. Such cases usually 
involve workers’ claims that they have been misclassified as “independent 
contractors” rather than “employees” or a third party’s claim that a 
purported “independent contractor” was actually an “employee,” so that the 
third party can sue the hiring party under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior (or, conversely, the hiring party might offer, as a defense to such a 
lawsuit, the argument that a purported “employee” was actually an 
“independent contractor”). 
In Clackamas, the defendant medical clinic sought to avoid liability 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),76 which only applies to 
employers with 15 or more employees.77 If the medical clinic could prevail 
in its argument that several of its doctors were not “employees” but 
“partners,” since they owned shares in the clinic and were professionals 
with a great deal of responsibility, then the clinic’s former employee would 
not be permitted to pursue an ADA claim against the clinic. But the Court 
held that just as employers cannot evade liability by labeling workers who 
meet the common-law definition of “employee” as “independent 
contractors,” it didn’t matter whether the clinic called the personnel in 
question “partners,” “shareholder-directors,” or any other title. If the 
doctors met the common-law definition of “employee,” then they were 
employees for the purposes of any statute incorporating the common-law 
definition.78 
Accordingly, modern work law simply does not permit hiring parties 
and workers to craft their own distinctive working relationships with 
exactly the features they select. Instead, work law insists that it doesn’t 
matter what you say in the contract – i.e., the parties can agree to describe 
 
 76. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327 – 385 (codified as 
amended at 42 U. S. C. § 12101). 
 77. Id. at § 12111(5). 
 78. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445-46 (“Rather than looking to the common law, petitioner 
argues that courts should determine whether a shareholder-director of a professional 
corporation is an ‘employee’ by asking whether the shareholder-director is, in reality, a 
‘partner.’ . . . The question whether a shareholder-director is an employee, however, cannot 
be answered by asking whether the shareholder-director appears to be the functional 
equivalent of a partner. Today there are partnerships that include hundreds of members, 
some of whom may well qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated in a small 
number of managing partners. . . . Thus, asking whether shareholder-directors are partners-
rather than asking whether they are employees-simply begs the question.”) (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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the worker as a “partner,” “independent contractor,” “franchisee,” or 
“comrade” – if the relationship as it is conducted in reality, after the 
contract is signed, fits the common law definition of the master-servant 
relationship. What, one might ask, is this common-law definition? So far, 
the only element of the test for employee status I have mentioned is 
“control,” which is the central focus of the definition.79 
However, the Darden Court notes that control is not the only factor 
relevant to determinations of employee status and explains that “[s]ince the 
common-law test contains ‘no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can 
be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship 
must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.’”80 
Accordingly, the Darden Court quotes Reid for its previous summary of the 
several factors involved in the test.81 
As the above-cited cases make clear, no matter how anachronistic the 
“master-servant relation” might seem to our modern sensibilities, it is still 
the foundation of the employment relation as it is defined and discussed in 
21st-century work litigation in the U.S. For example, the shipping company 
FedEx classifies most of its “Ground” and “Home Delivery” drivers as 
“independent contractors” rather than “employees,” and many of these 
drivers have brought a class action against the company to sue for damages 
 
 79. Id. at 448 (“At common law the relevant factors defining the master-servant 
relationship focus on the master’s control over the servant. The general definition of the 
term “servant” in the Restatement (Second) of Agency §2(2) (1957), for example, refers to a 
person whose work is ‘controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.’ See also 
id., §220(1) (‘A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another 
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to 
the other’s control or right to control’). In addition, the Restatement’s more specific 
definition of the term ‘servant’ lists factors to be considered when distinguishing between 
servants and independent contractors, the first of which is ‘the extent of control’ that one 
may exercise over the details of the work of the other. Id., §220(2)(a). We think that the 
common-law element of control is the principal guidepost that should be followed in this 
case.”). 
 80. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 
254, 258 (1968)). 
 81. Id. at 323-24 (“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the 
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner 
and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this 
inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of 
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has 
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in 
hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the 
tax treatment of the hired party.”). 
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and a declaration that they have the status and rights of employees.82 As 
investigative journalist Steven Greenhouse reports, in one such lawsuit 
“filed in California, a state judge ruled that the company was essentially 
engaged in a ruse in maintaining that its drivers were independent 
contractors.”83 
The plaintiffs in misclassification lawsuits of this sort assert that it is 
unlawful for businesses to label workers as “independent contractors,” 
thereby shifting many costs – such as those associated with providing 
unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, the 
employer’s share of federal taxes, health care coverage, vacation and sick 
time, and vehicles and other equipment and maintenance thereof – to their 
workforce, while nonetheless retaining and/or exercising the right of 
control traditionally enjoyed by employers. 
These lawsuits bring into sharp relief the main point I want to 
establish through discussing the work law of past and present, which I hope 
has already become clear throughout this section: Modern work law defines 
an “employee” as someone who is hired to work but is not an “independent 
contractor.” This is much the same as it was in Blackstone’s day, and while 
other aspects of the master-servant relation have changed, the test for 
servant/employee status persists largely undisturbed. The freedom-of-
contract view distorts the nature of work law because it suggests that we 
focus on the contracts by which an employer and employee may choose to 
enter a work relationship, despite the fact that a survey of modern work law 
demonstrates that there is precious little about how the relationship itself is 
defined, constituted, regulated, or conducted that the parties can lawfully 
establish or modify by contract. 
 
 82. STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN 
WORKER 123 (2008) (“In more than thirty lawsuits, FedEx Ground drivers have argued that 
they are employees, not independent contractors, and that the company should, as a result, 
pay for their trucks, insurance, repairs, gas, and tires. Many drivers mock FedEx Ground’s 
claim that they are independent entrepreneurs who can “grow” their business, considering 
that their business is delivering packages that FedEx assigns them. Similarly, many drivers 
ridicule the company’s assertions that they can show their business acumen and increase 
their profits through such supposedly enterprising steps as finding cheaper ways to repair 
their trucks. In a lawsuit that FedEx Ground drivers filed in California, a state judge ruled 
that the company was essentially engaged in a ruse in maintaining that its drivers were 
independent contractors. The judge wrote that FedEx Ground “has close to absolute control” 
over the drivers, adding that the operating agreement that the drivers sign “is a brilliantly 
drafted contract creating the constraints of an employment relationship . . . in the guise of an 
independent contractor model.” An appeals court upheld that decision in August 2007, 
writing that FedEx has “control over every exquisite detail of the drivers’ performance, 
including the color of their socks and the style of their hair.”). 
 83.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
I hope I could be forgiven for harboring the conceit that I have the 
freedom-of-contract view “on the ropes” at this point. After all, that view, 
which is arguably motivated by Maine’s enthusiastic endorsement of the 
relations created by free and independent contractors, holds that we should 
consider work law to be a mere branch of contract law, a branch that guides 
contract law by specifying what sorts of work relationships free contractors 
may choose to create. But as I have shown herein, modern work law simply 
doesn’t allow anyone to be both an “employee” and an “independent 
contractor,” and in the context of work, contractors are not at liberty to 
create any sort of relationship. To the contrary, although contracting parties 
are certainly free to describe the relationship they purport to “create” via 
contract in any way they like, if a court is ever called upon to apply the 
substantive provisions and requirements of work law to the relationship in 
question, the court and the law – not the contract – will determine the 
nature of the relationship in question and the rights and obligations that 
attach to the parties to the relationship. So why not simply call it a “win” 
for the relationship view and end this paper here? Well, it can’t be quite 
that easy to dispense with such a doughty dialectical opponent as the 
freedom-of-contract view. 
Even if my arguments in this paper convinced – or should convince – 
any erstwhile supporter of the freedom-of-contract view to reconsider her 
position, I wouldn’t be satisfied with that limited success, nor should a 
freedom-of-contract proponent feel especially deterred by it. For I have 
made clear from the outset that although I am interested in describing the 
way work law is, I am even more intent on arguing for a particular 
conception of how it should be. I assume that proponents of the freedom-
of-contract view would share my interest in offering a normative account of 
how work law should be, and I further assume that they would therefore 
argue that even if work law is just as I say it is, we should respond to this 
by cleansing modern work law of its 18th-Century trappings of “masters” 
and “servants” in favor of a work law that fulfills Maine’s bold prediction. 
Shouldn’t we freedom-loving folk strive to discard all connections with 
“property interests” in persons, entrenched hierarchy, and servitude, and 
strive to remake work law to allow everyone to bargain for no more and no 
less than he or she wills? In other words, the freedom-of-contract view 
might well offer the undeniably compelling argument that perpetuating the 
master-servant relation is a problem, and that we should solve this problem 
by moving – as Maine suggests – toward ever-greater independence and 
freedom to contract as we please. 
In response to this argument, I offer a sketch of a normative argument 
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I will expand upon in future work, which is that work law not only is a 
status-based relationship, but also that it should remain so, albeit with 
further modifications. In short, no matter how unsavory we might find its 
lingering associations with the law of master and servant, work law’s 
function of offering a hierarchical relationship of private governance within 
the workplace is not some quaint remnant of the past that we could easily 
slough off. As R. H. Coase argues in his seminal article “The Nature of the 
Firm,” modern systems of production seem to require governance and 
control of employees within firms rather than a series of one-off contracts 
between free and independent contractors.84 Coase entertains and attempts 
to answer several questions economists had previously taken for granted, 
such as why capital hires labor, rather than the other way around, and why 
firms exist at all, instead of leaving production entirely up to the market 
and the price mechanism.85 Since the price mechanism could theoretically 
lead independent capitalists, laborers, and entrepreneurs to collaborate on 
discrete projects in accordance with their respective needs and preferences, 
Coase investigates why individuals might have reason to create firms at 
all.86 
 
 84.   See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also 
Friedrich Engels, On Authority, in 4 FRIEDRICH ENGELS AND KARL MARX, THE MARX-
ENGELS READER 731 (1978) (“Wanting to abolish authority in large-scale industry is 
tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself, to destroy the power loom in order to return 
to the spinning wheel.”). 
 85.   Id. at 387 (“An economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by 
the price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an organism. The 
economic system ‘works itself.’ This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. 
These exercise foresight and choose between alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to 
be order in the system. But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent 
directly on the price mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to 
economic planning that it merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism. 
[This] description, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. 
Within a firm, the description does not fit at all. For instance, in economic theory we find 
that the allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the price 
mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result, A moves from 
Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y, except in so far as it compensates 
for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world, we find that there are 
many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to 
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is 
ordered to do so.” (citing Friedrich A. Hayek, The Trend of Economic Thinking, 40 
ECONOMICA 121 (1933))). 
 86.   Id. at 388 (“Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-
ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these 
market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with 
exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur co-ordinator, who directs production. It 
is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production. Yet, having regard to 
the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on 
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Coase argues that relying entirely on the market and price mechanism 
in this way would significantly increase costs, as it would be prohibitively 
expensive to negotiate and agree to a protracted series of contracts with 
various workers.87 Therefore, modern capitalist systems of production seem 
heavily to rely on firms, and firms, in turn, seem heavily to rely on the 
internal systems of governance made possible by our current, status-based 
work law. If Coase is correct, the goal of maintaining efficient production 
would give us strong reason to continue to allow employers88 to retain and 
exercise a broad “right of control” over their employees within firms. On 
the other hand, if Maine and like-minded thinkers are right to value 
freedom of contract and the relationships we would form thereby above all 
else, then we would have reason to eliminate any status-based influence 
that colors the employment relation, thereby converting all work 
relationships to purely contractual arrangements. But this would be 
impracticable if not impossible. 
For example, assume that it would be relatively simple and efficient 
for an individual to contract with another to perform a discrete task, such as 
moving a refrigerator, in exchange for payment, such as $20, on a one-time 
basis, so long as both parties shared a sufficient understanding of what the 
task involved, the nature of the payment, etc. However, it would be nigh-
impossible for two parties to draw up and fully specify a contractual 
agreement to the effect that one party would perform all the tasks that 
would or could be involved in occupying the role of servant or employee in 
 
without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?”) 
 87.   Id. at 390-91 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem 
to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of 
‘organising’ production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the 
relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence 
of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a 
separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be 
taken into account. Again, in certain markets, e.g., produce exchanges, a technique is 
devised for minimizing these contract costs; but they are not eliminated. It is true that 
contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. A factor of 
production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the 
factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if 
this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this 
series of contracts is substituted one. At this stage, it is important to note the character of the 
contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract is one 
whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to 
obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. The essence of the contract is 
that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur.  Within these limits, he 
can therefore direct the other factors of production.”). 
 88. Or worker-managers, in the case of worker-managed firms, which constitute a small 
but significant section of the economy and are consistent with Coase’s view of the nature 
and value of firm-based production. 
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exchange for wages and/or other compensation. It would not be sufficient – 
even if it were practicable in any realistic scenario – to provide an 
exhaustive list of tasks that the servant would be obliged to perform and 
when, where, and how they would all be performed. This is because such a 
list would not only be prohibitively difficult to generate, but also fail to 
provide the hiring party anywhere near the value he or she would receive 
by entering a standard, status-based work relationship as it is constituted by 
current work law. 
Under current work law, when two parties agree to enter a work 
relationship, they understand that they will occupy roles within a 
hierarchical relationship, such that the employee is agreeing to be subject to 
the employer’s authority and to do what the employer orders him or her to 
do – within limits defined and regulated by work law – at whatever times 
and places and in whatever manner the employer wants or requires. On the 
other hand, a purely contractual list of when, where, and how the employee 
agrees to perform various tasks would not provide the employer with any 
of the flexibility, the ability to respond to unforeseen (or unforeseeable) 
circumstances, or the simplicity of the traditional status-based work 
relationship. Moreover, such a list would offer no significant advantage 
over the similarly labor- and time-intensive process of executing a series of 
one-off agreements – apart from avoiding the transaction costs associated 
with negotiating a long series of contracts on an individual basis – to 
perform each task on the list as each became necessary, perhaps along with 
the worker’s agreement to be available in the places and times he or she is 
likely to be needed for these one-off tasks. So “purely contractual” work 
relationships sound not only outrageously difficult, but downright 
unappealing, especially for the hiring party. The average hiring party wants 
to be the boss, and he or she wants someone to join his or her firm and be 
an employee. Contracts alone don’t offer these options. 
In response, advocates of the freedom-of-contract view might protest 
that so long as both parties understand the nature of the traditional work 
relationship, they could use “employ” and other work-related terms in their 
contractual agreements and count on their shared understanding of such 
terms’ meaning in much the same way other contracting parties count on 
their shared understanding of terms like “purchase,” “insure,” or “widget.” 
But this would be wholly parasitic on the prior legal constitution of the 
employment relationship created by work law, rather than some widely 
shared and socially constructed linguistic or conceptual understanding of 
the terms. 
Moreover, even if the parties were somehow able to insist in their 
contract that they were adamantly not adopting various pre-existing legal 
terms of art, such as “employ,” “employee,” “right of control,” etc., the 
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newly created relationship they could thereby enter would almost certainly 
be far too unstable and uncertain for any savvy free contractor to accept. 
Without a substantive, independent (from contract law), and fully specified 
body of work law to define what these terms mean and entail as a matter of 
law, neither party could assume that the right of the “boss” to issue 
reasonable orders to the “worker” did or did not include a right to, e.g., 
indulge in sexual harassment or racially discriminatory put-downs, require 
engineers or other professional employees to clean toilets or paint fences – 
which our current work law, incidentally, probably would allow but 
arguably should not – and/or permit employees to take bathroom breaks at 
will. That is, even if we could somehow discard work law’s constitutive 
understanding of work relationships in order to make way for the unfettered 
creation of sui generis work relationships, it seems far from clear that 
anyone would have reason to seek that outcome. 
In summary, since work law is neither consistent with the freedom-of-
contract view’s portrayal of it nor likely to be improved by the view’s 
normative prescriptions for it, I conclude that we should abandon the 
freedom-of-contract view and adopt the more descriptively and 
normatively accurate relationship view that I have described and for which 
I have argued herein. 
 
